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Deborah L. Brake
Abstract
This essay addresses three issues surrounding Title IX’s application to women’s
sports that have been largely eclipsed by the recent controversy over Title IX’s
three-part test: the increasingly male composition of athletic leadership positions;
the focus on cutting men’s sports as a remedy to discrimination against women;
and the role of revenue and massive spending on men’s elite sports in justify-
ing gender inequality in sports. The essay links each of these issues to broader
questions and concerns in discrimination law more generally, and concludes that
deeper cultural change is necessary to fulfill Title IX’s promise.
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INTRODUCTION 
At the time of this Symposium in April of 2003, controversy over the 
recommendations proposed by the Secretary of Education’s Blue 
Ribbon Commission on Opportunity in Athletics to revise Title IX of 
                                                          
* This article was originally solicited and submitted for publication as part of a 
Symposium sponsored by the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & 
the Law, “Title IX: 30 Years Later,” which was held at American University, 
Washington College of Law on April 2, 2003. 
**Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  Many 
thanks to Sally Kenney and Karen O’Connor for the opportunity to present an early 
draft of this paper at the 2003 Annual Fall Conference of the Association for Public 
Policy Analysis and Management, and for their thoughtful comments. 
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the Education Amendments of 19721 took center stage in discussions 
about the law’s application to sports.  The Commission’s focus from 
the outset was on Title IX’s impact on men’s sports, responding to the 
male sports establishment’s claim that Title IX’s “unintended 
consequences” have forced cuts in men’s athletic programs.2  Not 
surprisingly, given the Commission’s composition and initial 
premises,3 many of its recommendations were geared toward 
loosening the three-part test for measuring equality in sport 
participation opportunities, thereby reducing the pressure on 
educational institutions to increase women’s share of athletic 
participation opportunities.4  The Commission’s final 
                                                          
 1. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1972); see also “Open To All”: Title IX at Thirty, 
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION’S COMMISSION ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS (U.S. 
Department of Education, Washington, DC), Feb. 28, 2003 [hereinafter Commission 
Report], available at http://www.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/athletics/title9report. 
pdf. 
 2. See Michael Dobie, EnTITLEment? It has Heard from the Public, Now the 
Title IX Commission  Faces Difficult Task of Agreeing on its Next Step, NEWSDAY, 
Nov. 24, 2002, at B16 (quoting U.S. Tennis Association official as saying, “[w]e are . . . 
concerned about [Title IX’s] unintended consequences”); see also Gender Equity in 
College Sports: 6 Views, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 6, 2002, at B8 (quoting 
Charles Neinas, former executive director of the College Football Association, as 
denouncing Title IX’s “unintended consequences of reducing opportunities for 
men”); Vicki Michaelis, Anthem Increasingly Her Song Too, USA TODAY, May 3, 
2001, at C6 (quoting U.S. Olympic Committee official as saying, “[t]he unintended 
consequences of Title IX—the decline of male sports opportunities—is very 
unfortunate”). 
 3. See DONNA DE VARONA & JULIE FOUDY, MINORITY VIEWS ON THE REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS, 18-20 (2003) [hereinafter MINORITY 
REPORT] (detailing flaws in the Commission’s process), available at  
http://www.womensportsfoundation.org/binary-data/WSF.ARTICLE/pdf_file/ 
944.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2004). 
 4. Under the governing standard for measuring equal accommodation of 
interests and abilities in the selection of sports, compliance is measured by the 
following three-part test: 
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female 
students are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective 
enrollments; or 
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among 
intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a history and 
continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to 
the developing interest and abilities of the members of that sex; or 
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate 
athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing practice of program 
expansion such as that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the 
interests and abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and effectively 
accommodated by the present program. 
See Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind 
Title IX, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 46-59 (2000-2001) (explaining the three-part 
test in detail); see also Letter from Gerald Reynolds, Assistant Secretary for Civil 
Rights, United States Department of Education Office of Civil Rights, to the Staff of 
the Office of Civil Rights (July 11, 2003), available at http://www.ed.gov/ 
about/offices/list/ocr/title9guidanceFinal.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2004); see, e.g., 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art7
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recommendations threatened to halt or even reverse much of the 
progress toward sex equality in sports made possible by Title IX.5 
Given the politics of the Bush Administration and the content of the 
Commission’s recommendations, the prospect of a weakened Title IX 
appeared imminent.6 
For the time being, however, Title IX has emerged from the latest 
controversy unscathed.  After first floating the possibility of 
considering only those recommendations that received a unanimous 
vote by the Commission—an inadequate concession, given that some 
of the most controversial recommendations were officially listed as 
unanimous despite the existence of a minority report highlighting a 
flawed process that did not allow for full consideration of many of 
these recommendations7—the Department of Education ultimately 
decided not to make any substantive changes to the official policies 
implementing and interpreting Title IX.8  For now, the administrative 
push to revise and weaken Title IX and its regulations and policies has 
receded. 
However, it is only a break in the battle, not the end of the culture 
war over Title IX.  Conservative legal and political organizations 
                                                          
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 5. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 36-39.  Some of the more 
problematic provisions included recommendations that the Department consider: 
revisiting the role of private funding of particular sports (Rec. 12); redefining 
substantial proportionality to allow for “a reasonable variance” in male/female sport 
participation opportunities relative to enrollment (Rec. 14); counting participation 
opportunities to include planned available slots, rather than the actual number of 
participants (Rec. 15); excluding walk-on athletes from counted participants (Rec. 
17); permitting the use of interest surveys as a basis for demonstrating compliance 
(Rec. 18); permitting institutions to demonstrate compliance by mirroring the 
relative participation rates at other levels of sport, such as high school or youth 
leagues, or the relative interests from surveys of prospective or enrolled students (Rec. 
19); exempting nontraditional students from the athletics participation calculation 
(Rec. 20); adopting alternative measures of compliance wholly apart from the three-
part test (Rec. 23).  See also The Attack on Women’s Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 
2003, at A20 (“The Commission’s recommendations would create enough exceptions 
to significantly undermine the equality that Title IX has always stood for.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Diana Jean Schemo, Women’s Athletics; Female Athletes Attack 
Plans to Change Title IX, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2003, at D2 (explaining that the 
Commission’s revisions “could cost female athletes nearly a million places a year in 
sports programs”); Lance Pugmire, An Uneasy Step for Title IX, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 
2003, at D1 (quoting an aide of a top Democrat as saying that the Bush 
Administration “is going after everything it perceives to have a quota attached to 
it . . . .  They clearly have an agenda, one that could potentially disenfranchise a lot of 
people.”). 
 7. See MINORITY REPORT, supra note 3, at 12-18 (detailing objections to 
Commission’s recommendations). 
 8. See Letter from Gerald Reynolds, supra note 4; see also Mike Terry, Decision 
Retains Title IX Status Quo, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 2003, at D1 (stating that the purpose 
of the letter was to clarify the three-part test and emphasize that all three tests have 
equal weight). 
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continue to place a high priority on weakening Title IX as part of 
their broader political and legal agenda, and concerns about the law’s 
impact on men’s sports opportunities still dominate media coverage 
of Title IX.9  In the latest legal skirmish, the College Sports Council, 
an organization that opposes the current interpretation of Title IX, 
filed suit against the General Accounting Office, claiming that it 
reported flawed data in a 2001 report citing net gains to men’s sports 
in the post-Title IX era,10 and that this data was used to support the 
continued application of existing Title IX standards.11  This lawsuit, 
filed on the heels of the dismissal of a much more threatening lawsuit 
brought by men’s sports associations against the Department of 
Education challenging the legality of the Title IX regulations and the 
three-part test, shows both the tenacity and increasing desperation of 
the anti-Title IX agenda.12 
Attacks on the three-part test will undoubtedly continue to 
percolate.  In a prior article, I have offered a defense of the three-part 
test and the theory behind it.13  Rather than revisit the controversy 
over that test, this essay will focus on three respects in which the law’s 
existing conception of discrimination fails to reach far enough to 
ensure girls and women equality in sports.  Greater progress toward 
sex equality in sports requires not just holding the line on existing 
legal requirements, but further evolution in the law’s approach to 
discrimination and equality guarantees.  This essay will consider Title 
IX’s legacy in connection with three remaining challenges to the 
transformative potential of Title IX, highlighting existing 
inadequacies in the prevailing legal approach.  Specifically, this essay 
will examine the continuing decline of women in coaching jobs and 
its impact on female athleticism; the too-ready acceptance of cuts in 
men’s opportunities as a remedy to discrimination against women; 
and the role of cost-based justifications in preserving the status quo 
sports establishment and its resistance to the kinds of restructuring 
                                                          
 9. See Welch Suggs, Colleges Make Slight Progress Toward Gender Equity in 
Sports, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 25, 2003, at A30 (“The question of saving men’s 
teams has been the hottest topic in Title IX circles since President Bush took office.”). 
 10. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: FOUR-YEAR 
COLLEGES’ EXPERIENCES ADDING AND DISCONTINUING TEAMS (2001) (stating that the 
number of men participating in intercollegiate sports increased from 220,000 to 
232,000 between 1981 and 1991). 
 11. See In Brief, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Sept. 13, 2003, at 10C. 
 12. See Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 02-0072, slip op. at 
55-109, 116-19 (D.O.C. June 11, 2003) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to 
challenge the Title IX regulations and interpretation since they failed to demonstrate 
that invalidating the regulations would ensure the reinstatement or retention of any 
men’s teams). 
 13. See Brake, supra note 4, at 13. 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art7
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that would enable further expansion of women’s sports to coexist with 
the retention of men’s sports.  While far from comprehensive, these 
brief discussions serve to underscore three respects in which Title IX 
interpretation does not go far enough toward the elimination of 
institutional practices that perpetuate sex inequality in sports.  Title 
IX’s laudable legacy of transforming girls’ and women’s participation 
in sports, rich as it is, must not eclipse the shortcomings of existing 
legal interpretation and the challenges that remain. 
I.  TITLE IX’S LEGACY: EXPLOSIVE GROWTH IN GIRLS’ AND WOMEN’S 
SPORTS PARTICIPATION, BUT DEEP-SEATED RESISTANCE TO 
CHALLENGING MALE PRIVILEGE IN THE STRUCTURE OF SPORTS 
Title IX’s role in furthering the explosive growth of girls’ and 
women’s sports has been widely acknowledged.  Compared to the 
294,000 girls who participated in interscholastic athletics in 1971, 
there were over 2.8 million girls who participated in interscholastic 
athletics in 2002-2003.14  The number of women participating in 
intercollegiate sports has gone from just below 32,000 in 1971 to over 
160,000 in 2004.15  Even in recent years, with constricted budgets and 
repeated claims that some institutions have cut men’s sports 
opportunities, rather than increase sports opportunities for women, 
the numbers of female athletes have continued to climb.16 
These tremendous increases in girls’ and women’s sports 
participation could not have been predicted at the time Title IX was 
adopted.  At congressional hearings on the Title IX regulations, 
opponents of the Title IX standards charged that the creation of full-
blown sports programs for girls and women would be irresponsible 
given the limited interest to support them.17  Subsequent experience 
with three decades of Title IX has exposed this argument as sexist and 
                                                          
 14. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation; 
Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,419 (Dec. 11, 1979); 
Women’s Sports Foundation, Women’s Sports & Fitness Facts and Statistics, June 1, 
2004, at 14, available at http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/binary-
data/WSF_ARTICLE/pdf_file/28.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2004). 
 15. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation; 
Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,419 (Dec. 11, 1979); 
Women’s Sports Foundation, supra note 14, at 15. 
 16. See Suggs, supra note 9, at A30-32 (noting that the number of women playing 
college sports at Division I schools increased from an average of 143 in 1995-96 to 208 
in 2001-02). 
 17. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Women’s Law Center at 29, Cohen v. 
Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (No. 95-2205) (quoting the testimony of a 
representative of the American Football Coaches Association, stating “[t]o have equal 
women’s athletic programs emerge full blown without possibly a demand for them 
seems a little irresponsible”). 
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short-sighted.  The unprecedented growth of women’s sports in the 
post-Title IX years has demonstrated the extent to which interest 
depends on opportunity structures.18 
The importance of the sheer numbers of girls and women now 
playing competitive sports should not be understated.  With more 
than one out of three high school girls today competing on a school 
sports team, school sports for girls have become commonplace.19  
Studies have shown that girls who compete in sports not only receive a 
physical benefit, but also benefit academically and socially.  Girls who 
play sports have higher self-esteem, less risk of depression, a lower 
likelihood of engaging in high-risk behaviors, and perform better in 
school than girls who do not play sports.20  The increased popularity 
of, and participation in, girls’ and women’s interscholastic and 
intercollegiate sports has fueled greater interest and activity in 
women’s sports at all levels.21  By playing sports, girls and women gain 
the opportunity to develop new relationships with their bodies, as a 
source of strength and learning.22  The benefits to the girls and 
women who play sports have positive spillover effects in the culture, 
both within and beyond the world of sports.23 
However, despite these successes, Title IX’s legacy is not one of 
unmitigated success.  Like other social institutions, sport has been 
resilient in preserving male privilege in its deepest structures.  
Professor Reva Siegel has noted the capacity of social structures to 
                                                          
 18. See Brake, supra note 4, at 69-122 (discussing the extent to which institutional 
practices shape male and female interest and experiences in sports). 
 19. See id. at 15-17 (documenting the growth of girls’ and women’s sports 
participation in the post-Title IX era). 
 20. See Hannah Storm, Title IX Offers Fair Play for All, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 22, 
2002, at 12 (reporting that girls who participate in sports have higher grade point 
averages and SAT scores than girls who do not play sports, and that sports increases 
girls’ motivation and optimism, and decreases the chances of teen pregnancy, 
depression, drug abuse, and an eating disorder); see also Bonnie Erbe, Men’s College 
Teams: Let’s Stop the Whining, NEWSDAY, July 22, 2003, at A26 (citing the Women’s 
Sports Foundation findings from a 1989 study “showing that girls who participate in 
sports are less likely to get involved with drugs, less likely to become pregnant and 
more likely to graduate from high school than those who do not play sports”). 
 21. See Storm, supra note 20, at 12 (stating that “[h]igh profile college 
programs . . . bolstered by Title IX, have led to success as in the Olympics” and have 
helped create women’s professional teams). 
 22. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND 
LAW 121 (1987) (describing the potential for women’s participation in sports to 
transform female bodies from objects into subjects). 
 23. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, Bad Girls and Good Sports: Some Reflections on 
Violent Female Juvenile Delinquents, Title IX, & the Promise of Girl Power, 27 
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 667, 699-701, 710-13 (2000) (documenting the varied benefits 
of sports participation for girls and women, and arguing that sports participation has 
the potential to help girls and women avoid high-risk behaviors by channeling 
competition into a healthy outlet). 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art7
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resist challenges to inequality through a phenomenon she calls 
“preservation through transformation,” in which institutions adapt to 
shifts in ideology and cultural norms by avoiding overt conflicts with a 
new legal and social order, while still preserving the underlying 
structure of inequality.24  Professor Siegel uses as an example the legal 
invalidation of Jim Crow segregation, and the subsequent 
development of a discriminatory intent standard that operates to 
preserve much of the underlying inequality in a manner that 
comports with the modern ideology of color-blindness.25  In this 
example and others, she illustrates the capacity of discriminatory 
practices to change form in response to cultural and ideological shifts 
while still operating to enforce social stratification.26 
Likewise, in the world of sport, despite massive shifts in female 
sports participation, there has been a good deal of “preservation 
through transformation,” as the opportunity structures have 
regrouped to preserve the central features of male privilege in sport.  
For Title IX to further challenge sex bias in sports, it must extend to a 
wider range of practices that preserve male privilege in the structures 
of sport. 
II. LEADERSHIP STRUCTURES IN SPORT: MORE WOMEN PLAY, BUT 
FEWER WOMEN LEAD 
The disproportionate attention paid to the alleged loss of some 
male athletic opportunities in particular sports in recent years27 
contrasts sharply with the relative inattention given to the one area in 
which Title IX has coincided with a devastating loss of opportunity: 
positions for women coaches and athletic administrators.28  In this 
                                                          
 24. For a sampling of articles discussing this phenomenon, see Reva B. Siegel, 
1998-99 Brennan Center Symposium Lecture: Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: 
How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 77 (2000) (illustrating “preservation through transformation” in the 
context of civil rights and domestic violence law); Reva B. Siegel, The Critical Use of 
History: Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113-14, 1142 (1997) (using the 
concept to point out that while a “color blind” antidiscrimination legal standard was 
appropriate to battle early facial discrimination, it may not be the most appropriate 
lens through which to view discrimination in today’s world); Reva B. Siegel, “The 
Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2175-87 
(1996) (comparing current equal protection doctrine with legal rationales for 
segregation). 
 25. See Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 24, at 1113-
14, 1129-48 (arguing that after Jim Crow was challenged and defeated, it was replaced 
by new practices and principles such as the intent requirement that preserve much of 
the prior social stratification). 
 26. See id. at 1142 (noting that “status enforcing state action is mutable in form”). 
 27. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 28. See Suggs, supra note 9, at A30 (noting that over the past thirty years, the 
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460 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 12:3 
area, the loss of opportunity is both severe and more clearly a by-
product of Title IX, in combination with other discrimination laws 
such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196429 and the Equal Pay 
Act of 1963.30 
The percentage of women who hold jobs coaching women college 
athletes has dropped from ninety percent in 1972, to forty-four 
percent in 2002, the lowest level on record.31  Recent trends suggest 
that the decline in women’s share of coaching jobs in women’s sports 
will not reverse itself any time soon.32  Although 361 new coaching 
positions were created in women’s athletics from 2000 to 2002, more 
than ninety percent of them were filled by men.33  The decline in 
women’s access to jobs coaching women athletes is not offset by any 
increase in women’s access to jobs coaching men; during the past 
thirty years, women’s share of jobs coaching male athletes has held 
steady at just below two percent.34 
The gender divide in access to coaching jobs is exacerbated by pay 
structures that reserve the highest coaching salaries for coaches of 
men’s sports.35  Disparities in pay for the coaches of male and female 
athletes have continued to increase, so that women are effectively 
barred from securing the highest paid coaching jobs in college 
athletics.36 
Women’s share of jobs in athletics administration also has declined 
                                                          
number of women coaching women’s college teams has steadily shrunk and in 
addition, women have not made many inroads coaching men’s teams). 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2004). 
 30. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2004). 
 31. See R. VIVIAN ACOSTA & LINDA JEAN CARPENTER, WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE 
SPORT: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY—TWENTY FIVE YEAR UPDATE 1977-2002 (2002) 
[hereinafter WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT], available at http://www.ncaa.org/ 
gender_equity/resource_materials/Historical/women_in_intercollegiate_sport.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2004). 
 32. See id. (reporting that the decrease in number of females coaching women 
has been steady in recent years: 47.4% in 1998 and 45.6% in 2000). 
 33. See WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT, supra note 31, at 8. 
 34. See id. In February 2003, Tennessee State University Athletic Director Teresa 
Phillips made history as the first woman to coach a men’s Division I basketball team 
when she filled in for the regular men’s coach who was serving a one-game 
suspension.  The specter of a woman coaching a men’s basketball team made national 
news.  See Jere Longman, Female Coach Wins Acceptance, if Not the Game, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at D1. 
 35. See Suggs, supra note 9, at A30 (reporting that the average salary for coaching 
men’s sports was $81,643, while the average salary for coaches of women’s teams was 
$46,382). 
 36. See id. (citing data showing that coaches of women’s teams made about 
$3,500 more in 2001-2002 than they did in 2000-2001, but that the pay for coaches of 
men’s teams increased by about $9,300). 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art7
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significantly in the post-Title IX era.37  With the merger of formerly 
discrete women’s athletics programs into a unified structure 
combining men’s and women’s programs, fewer leadership positions 
in sports are held by women.38  Before Title IX, when women’s 
athletics departments were managed separately from men’s athletics, 
women held virtually all of the administrative positions for women’s 
sports.39  Today, women remain tokens in leadership positions in 
intercollegiate athletics.40 
Existing interpretations of discrimination law effectively encourage 
the dearth of women’s leadership roles in competitive sport.  The law 
does not recognize the underrepresentation of women in athletic 
leadership roles and women’s declining share of coaching jobs as an 
equality problem for female athletes.  The law’s blindness, however, 
does not erase the very real implications of male athletic leadership 
for female athletic experience and for sex equality in sport more 
broadly.  By linking leadership and competence in sports with 
maleness, sport’s leadership structure reinforces women’s marginal 
place in sports and reinserts a risk that the empowering potential of 
sports will be thwarted by gender dynamics that reinforce male 
dominance.41  Inequality in sport leadership shapes the aspirations 
and experiences of female athletes, reinforcing cultural and 
institutional norms that devalue female athleticism.42  Sadly, many 
women athletes internalize the norms linking athletic competence 
with masculinity, and express preferences for male coaches.43  The 
                                                          
 37. See WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT, supra note 31, at 2 (reporting that in 
2002, “17.9% of women’s sports programs [were] directed by a female . . . .” 
compared to more than 90% in 1972). 
 38. See Patricia A. Cain, Women, Race, and Sports: Life Before Title IX, 4 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 338, 350 (2001) (documenting the history of the NCAA 
takeover of women’s intercollegiate sports and pointing to decreased levels of 
women’s leadership for women’s sports). 
 39. See WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT, supra note 31, at 2 (highlighting that 
“in 1972 more than 90% of women’s programs were directed by a female head 
administrator”). 
 40. See id. (reporting that women hold 31.2% of the administrative job in 
intercollegiate athletics, and even that number overstates women’s real power in the 
athletics leadership structure, since women are more likely to be in support staff 
positions rather than in policy-making positions). 
 41. See Rhonda Reaves, “There’s No Crying in Baseball”: Sports and the Legal 
and Social Construction of Gender, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 283, 289-303, 312-14 
(2001) (discussing the problem of male coaches’ sexual harassment of female athletes 
and the inadequacy of existing interpretations of sexual harassment law to reach this 
conduct). 
 42. See Brake, supra note 4, at 88-90 (discussing the importance of gender 
inequality in sport leadership structures in influencing the sports participation and 
interest of women athletes). 
 43. See id. at 88. 
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internalized devaluation of feminine athleticism by women athletes 
influences their own relationship to sport.44  Equally problematic is 
the presumption implicit in the absence of female coaches coaching 
male athletes: that women would not be respected or competent in 
coaching male athletes.45  Title IX’s failure to recognize the gender 
hierarchy in sport leadership as gender discrimination that affects 
athletes is deeply unsatisfying. 
Nor does Title IX provide a meaningful remedy for the under-
valuation of women’s coaches as reflected in the enormous disparities 
in coaching salaries for men’s and women’s teams.46  As more 
women’s sports, and hence coaching jobs, were created in the post-
Title IX years, and more money was spent on women’s programs, men 
were increasingly drawn to jobs coaching female athletes, without any 
compensating increase in access for women to the jobs coaching male 
athletes.47  Although Title IX forced institutions to spend more 
money than they had been spending on women’s sports, it did not 
begin to challenge the massive divide in salaries for coaches of men’s 
sports and coaches of women’s sports.  The disparities in coaches’ pay 
for men’s sports and women’s sports remain striking.  The under-
compensation of the coaches of women’s teams also shapes female 
athletic experience by reinforcing the disparate valuation of men’s 
and women’s athletics.  Yet Title IX does next to nothing about the 
disparities in coaches’ pay.  Although coaches’ compensation is one 
factor listed in the “equal treatment” factors for measuring equal 
athletic opportunity in the Title IX regulations, female athletes may 
not challenge pay disparities in coaches’ compensation unless they 
prove that the lesser amount of money spent on coaches for female 
athletes purchases a lower quality of coaching.48  So interpreted, the 
law effectively requires female athletes to indict their coaches in order 
to address pay discrimination in coaches’ salaries.  Not surprisingly, 
Title IX has made no headway in minimizing disparities in valuing 
men’s and women’s coaches. 
Not only does Title IX fail to provide a remedy for the gender 
hierarchies in sport leadership, but in many respects, discrimination 
law encourages the marginalization and devaluation of women in 
                                                          
 44. See id. at 88-90. 
 45. See id. at 88-89. 
 46. See Suggs, supra note 9, at A30. 
 47. Cf. Reaves, supra note 41, at 312-14 (arguing that female sports adopted the 
“win-at-all-costs” model of men’s sports, which retains a style of coaching that “favors 
male coaches over female coaches” to the detriment of female athletes). 
 48. See Brake, supra note 4, at 128-29 (detailing the inadequacies in Title IX’s 
application to disparities in coaches’ pay for men’s and women’s sports). 
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these roles.  The only law that has been even marginally successful in 
addressing the pay discrimination against the coaches of women’s 
teams is the Equal Pay Act, which requires institutions to pay equal 
salaries to persons of the opposite sex who perform substantially 
similar work.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
(“EEOC”) current policy guidance on coaches’ pay makes it possible 
in certain circumstances to successfully bring Equal Pay Act claims 
where a man and a woman are paid different salaries to coach men’s 
and women’s teams in the same sport.49  However, because the law is 
only triggered when a man and a woman hold substantially similar 
jobs at different levels of pay, it has the perverse incentive of 
encouraging institutions to solve their Equal Pay Act problems by 
hiring male coaches to coach female athletes.50  The Equal Pay Act 
has no application to an institution that pays male coaches of 
women’s teams less than the male coaches of men’s teams.  Although 
Title VII, in theory, prevents outright hiring discrimination against 
women in coaching jobs, for male or female athletes, the difficulty of 
proving intentional discrimination renders this prohibition easily 
evaded.51 
A final example of how the law preserves existing hierarchies in 
sport leadership to the detriment of female athletes is in its failure to 
adequately protect employees from retaliation for raising equality 
issues on behalf of female athletes.  In a decision remarkable for its 
blindness to the equality implications for female athletes, the Eleventh 
Circuit recently held in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education 
that a coach who complains of Title IX violations against a women’s 
team has no right to bring a private action under Title IX’s anti-
retaliation provision after being fired in retaliation for raising such 
issues.52  The Eleventh Circuit held that because the anti-retaliation 
regulatory provision exceeded the statute’s nondiscrimination 
mandate, the regulations could not support a retaliation claim by 
coaches or other employees.53  In failing to recognize anti-retaliation 
                                                          
 49. See generally EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, NO. 915.002, 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE COMPENSATION OF SPORTS 
COACHES IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1997). 
 50. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2004) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
sex between wages to any employees “at a rate less than the rate at which he pays 
wages to employees of the opposite sex for equal work”). 
 51. See, e.g., EEOC v. Madison County United Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577, 
586 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that school district’s hiring of more males to coach girls’ 
teams after the EEOC Equal Pay Act investigation began was not hiring 
discrimination, since “efforts to bring one’s conduct into conformity with one’s 
litigating posture are not evidence of willful noncompliance with the law”). 
 52. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 53. See id. at 1347-48. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
  
464 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 12:3 
as implicit in the anti-discrimination norm, the court undercut the 
rights of female athletes by denying protection to the persons who 
may be best-situated (as adults and knowledgeable actors within the 
athletics inner circle) to raise issues of inequality affecting female 
athletes. 
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Jackson and is 
poised to decide whether Title IX implicitly includes a private right of 
action to sue for retaliation.54  In a Brief filed by the Solicitor General, 
the United States has weighed in on behalf of recognizing an implied 
right of action for retaliation, as have numerous other amici.55  In 
light of the high stakes for Title IX enforcement, it is likely that the 
Court will reject the Eleventh Circuit’s extreme ruling denying 
persons protection from retaliation for asserting Title IX violations.  
However, even if the Court reverses the ruling in Jackson, important 
issues remain about the scope of law’s protection from retaliation.  In 
recent years, a number of doctrines have emerged that limit legal 
protection from retaliation, and these doctrines are likely to be 
imported into Title IX retaliation claims as well.56  Regardless of how 
the Court decides Jackson, it is likely that coaches and other 
employees will receive less than full protection from retaliation when 
they raise issues about their institution’s Title IX compliance. 
In addition to decreasing the chances that institutions will address 
program inequalities that affect female athletes, the law’s failure to 
adequately protect coaches and administrators from retaliation for 
raising Title IX issues on behalf of their athletes may undercut gender 
equality in sport in another respect as well.  If the sociological 
literature on tokenism is correct, we might expect that the women 
coaches and administrators who raise Title IX concerns on behalf of 
                                                          
 54. See 124 S.Ct. 2834 (2004). 
 55. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 124 S. Ct. 2834 (2004) (No. 02-1672); Brief of 
the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Jackson 
(No. 02-1672); Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Education Association in Support 
of Petitioner, Jackson (No. 02-1672); Brief of Amicus Curiae Leadership Conference 
on Civil Rights in Support of Petitioner, Jackson (No. 02-1672); Amici Curaie Brief of 
Women’s Sports Foundation in Support of the Petitioner, Jackson (No. 02-1672); 
Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Partnership for Women & Families and 31 Other 
Organizations and Individuals in Support of Petitioner, Jackson (No. 02-1672). 
 56. See, e.g., Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003) (recognizing an 
implied right of action for retaliation under Title VI, but limiting such claims to 
retaliation for asserting intentional discrimination, as opposed to disparate impact, 
since conduct amounting to mere disparate impact could not be “reasonably 
believed” to violate the statute).  For a thorough discussion and critique of doctrinal 
limitations on retaliation claims, see Deborah L. Brake, Theorizing Retaliation: The 
Under-Protection of Discrimination Claimants and the Preservation of the Social 
Order (forthcoming) (on file with author). 
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female athletes would be particularly subject to penalties, as their 
female status within a male-dominated structure already marks them 
as “outsiders” and trouble-makers.57  If this is true, the law’s refusal to 
protect against retaliation may be particularly damaging to women in 
athletic leadership, effectively encouraging institutions to punish 
those women coaches and administrators who raise Title IX concerns 
with impunity.  The cyclical effect may be to drive more women out of 
athletics leadership roles and further reinforce a culture of tokenism. 
As a whole, discrimination law works to preserve a culture of male 
leadership in sports that both devalues the coaches of women’s sports 
and enforces a strict gender divide in coaching positions over men’s 
and women’s sports. At the same time, it facilitates the 
marginalization of women as leaders in sport by creating incentives to 
hire men as the coaches and administrators for female athletes.  And 
finally, not only does the law accept the severe under-representation 
of women in athletic leadership roles, it provides little protection to 
the few women who are brave enough to assert the equality interests 
of their female students.  Despite the inadequacy, and even perverse 
incentives of, discrimination law as applied to women in coaching and 
athletic administration positions, no national commission has been 
established to investigate the law’s “unintended consequences” for 
these women, and the issue has received relatively scant media 
attention, particularly in comparison to the media frenzy about Title 
IX’s consequences for male athletes.58 
Most problematically, none of this is recognized as an equality 
problem for female athletes.  By divorcing the issues facing women in 
coaching and athletics administration from the experience of female 
athletes and taking a piecemeal approach to discrimination, the law 
fails to recognize the extent to which inequality in sport leadership 
                                                          
 57. See Annelies Knoppers, Gender and the Coaching Profession, in WOMEN, 
SPORT, AND CULTURE 119, 128-30 (Susan Birrell & Cheryl L. Cole, eds., 1990) 
(discussing the implications of tokenism as it applies to women coaches and athletics 
administrators). 
 58. For some of the more prominent recent critiques of Title IX from this 
perspective, see JESSICA GAVORA, TILTING THE PLAYING FIELD: SCHOOLS, SPORTS, SEX, 
AND TITLE IX (2002); John Irving, Wrestling with Title IX, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2003, at 
A21; George F. Will, A Train Wreck Called Title IX, NEWSWEEK, May 27, 2002, at 82.  
For surveys of arguments on both sides in the debate, see Michele Orecklin, Now 
She’s Got Game: Title IX Helped More Women Get Into Sports, But Opponents 
Complain Its Pushing Men Out, TIME, Mar. 3, 2003, at 53; Gender Equity in College 
Sports: 6 Views, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 6, 2002, at B7-B10.  See also Ellen 
J. Staurowsky, Title IX and College Sport: The Long Painful Path to Compliance and 
Reform, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 95, 97 (2003) (describing the Commission as “a 
$700,000, taxpayer-funded, government inquiry, which fueled Title IX passions 
around the country, politicized the education of children, and slowed enforcement 
[and which] resulted only in a restatement of policy well-established for over twenty-
five years and upheld in eight federal appellate courts”). 
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affects the female athletes who play sports.  Insofar as the law 
preserves male privilege in sport leadership, it further marginalizes 
the women who play sports.  A more holistic approach would 
recognize the linkage between fully valuing female athletes and fully 
accepting women as leaders in sport. 
III. CUTS IN MEN’S SPORTS AS A REMEDY FOR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
WOMEN 
A second obstacle in securing further progress under Title IX is the 
current acceptance of cutting men’s sports as an adequate remedy for 
discrimination against women.59  Although the claims made by Title 
IX opponents of lost male athletic opportunities are grossly 
overstated, it is true that some institutions have chosen to cut or cap 
men’s opportunities in the so-called non-revenue sports as part of a 
plan to comply with Title IX, rather than choosing the path to 
compliance that adds new athletic opportunities for women.60  They 
have made this choice not because Title IX requires it, but to avoid 
having to squeeze the excess resources out of the most-favored men’s 
sports programs (the so-called revenue producers) needed to fund 
additional opportunities for women.61 
Such a strategy retains the privileges for the most-favored men’s 
sports while re-valuing remaining segments of the men’s sports 
program as expendable.  In the institutional calculation, the newly 
lost male opportunities were valuable enough to warrant funding 
under the old (non-equitable) gender system, but the combined value 
of retaining the least-valued sport opportunities for men and adding 
new ones for women does not match the greater value of preserving 
the resources for the most-privileged men’s sports.  Thus, new 
                                                          
 59. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that 
Brown University was in violation of Title IX’s three-part test, but rejecting district 
court’s remedy requiring it to add teams for women on the ground that Brown could 
comply by cutting men’s opportunities as well as by adding opportunities for women). 
 60. See Steven H. Biondolillo, Comply Without Cutting, CHI. TRIB., July 20, 2003, 
at C9 (arguing that cutting men’s sports “has been the unimaginative and expedient 
solution for scores of male athletic directors . . . whose myopic interest is in 
‘protecting’ the major male (read: revenue) sports”). 
 61. See WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT, supra note 31, at 9 (criticizing the 
practice of cutting men’s teams as a method of moving toward gender equity and 
emphasizing that such a practice is not required by Title IX); see also Liz Clarke, At 
Fiesta Bowl, Women Score the First Points, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2003, at A1 (quoting 
Ohio State President as saying, “We shouldn’t pretend that we’re cutting back on 
men’s sports because of Title IX. We’re not. We’re cutting back on men’s sports 
because we have some very expensive men’s athletic programs.”); Marianne Mears, 
Only Sporting to Keep Title IX Strong, HOUST. CHRON., July 21, 2003, at A18 (noting 
that colleges have ways to preserve men’s wrestling and gymnastic teams by cutting 
costs of football stadiums, recruiting and coaches’ salaries). 
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women’s sports opportunities are not valued enough to warrant the 
restructuring of athletic programs to make room for them. 
This strategy effectively punishes the women who bring equality 
claims by depriving them of any benefit and making them the 
scapegoats for the losses of men’s teams.62  It also jeopardizes the 
popularity (and survivability) of Title IX itself, as the recent 
controversy over whether to abandon or substantially weaken the 
three-part test demonstrates.63  By accepting cuts in men’s programs 
as an adequate remedy for inequality in women’s opportunities, the 
structure that privileges men’s sports opportunities is preserved, while 
Title IX and the women who bring sex equality claims are framed as 
the villains responsible for victimizing the male athletes who lost their 
sports.64  Although such a strategy hurts the most expendable men’s 
programs in the process, the decision ultimately reinforces the lower 
valuation of women’s sports generally, as not worth the restructuring 
it would take to add them. 
The political and media emphasis on lost male opportunities 
further reinforces the privileging of male sports and the devaluation 
of women’s sports.  The actual losses of particular men’s sports 
opportunities are disproportionate to the amount of attention 
devoted to this issue, thus reinforcing the differential valuation of 
male and female athletes.65  Far more female athletes have been 
added to college athletic programs than male athletes have been cut 
in recent years.66  Even focusing exclusively on the men’s side of the 
                                                          
 62. See, e.g., John Romano, Title IX: Evil or Equalizer?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES 
(Fla.), May 31, 2002, at 1C (quoting University of Florida associate athletic director as 
saying that some universities “have chosen to cut some of their men’s sports. But it’s 
been disturbing to women that they continually blame Title IX for these cuts, when 
often times they haven’t managed their money very well.”). 
 63. For examples of how Title IX opponents attempt to use claims of lost 
opportunities for male athletes to undermine Title IX, see JESSICA GAVORA, TILTING 
THE PLAYING FIELD: SCHOOLS, SPORTS, SEX, AND TITLE IX (2003); George F. Will, A 
Train Wreck Called Title IX, NEWSWEEK, May 27, 2002, at 82. 
 64. As I have argued elsewhere, such a “thin” interpretation of equality that 
uncritically accepts leveling down as a remedy to discrimination is not a necessary 
feature in discrimination law.  My proposal would carefully scrutinize leveling down 
responses to make sure that they fully remedy the expressive and relational injuries of 
discrimination. See Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: 
The Leveling Down Problem in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 
2004) (on file with author). 
 65. See Michael Dobie, Title IX Comes of Age; Or Does It?, NEWSDAY, June 23, 
2002, at C13 (“Despite the astronomical increase in women’s participation, there are 
more men’s teams and men’s athletes in college overall than there were in 
1972 . . . .”). 
 66. See Title IX, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), July 22, 2003, at 1C (citing CHRON. 
OF HIGHER EDUC. survey data showing that in 2001-2002, an average of 267 male and 
208 female athletes participated in athletics at a Division-I school, compared to an 
average of 244 male and 143 female athletes in 1995-1996). 
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equation, more male sports opportunities have been created in NCAA 
athletic programs in recent years than have been cut.67  Yet, by 
making lost male athletes the focal point, Title IX’s opponents force 
the advocates of women’s sports into the defensive posture of having 
to prove that Title IX has not hurt men’s opportunities.68  The 
debate’s focus on how Title IX impacts male athletes contributes to a 
construction of sport that values men’s athletic opportunities as more 
important than women’s athletic opportunities, further marginalizing 
women as athletes.69 
In the controversy over Title IX’s fairness to male athletes, the 
typical response by Title IX advocates has been to claim that any loss 
of men’s sports opportunities has nothing to do with Title IX, and 
that it is the product of budgetary and other considerations.  This is 
an accurate statement insofar as it recognizes the reality that Title IX 
never forces an institution to cut men’s sports because it may always 
choose to comply by adding sports for women.70  Yet, there is a sense 
in which the choice to cut spaces for some male athletes, rather than 
to add more sports for women, is very much about Title IX and the 
grudging attitude toward sex equality that it represents.71  It reflects 
the determination that opportunities that had been worth providing 
                                                          
 67. See Suggs, supra note 9 (reporting that since 1996-1997, only thirty-eight 
colleges reported dropping more than ten percent of their male athletes, while 165 
reported adding more than ten percent). 
 68. See Maryann Hudson Harvey, Title IX Returns to Courthouse, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 19, 2002, at D3 (stating that “women’s groups that oppose reform, such as the 
Women’s Sports Foundation and the National Women’s Law Center . . . contend it is 
the schools’ choice to comply by dropping teams”); see also Dobie, supra note 65, at 
C13 (describing Title IX supporters as claiming that “if Title IX did produce some 
unintended consequences for men, that was the result of choices made by college 
athletic directors, and not [Title IX] itself”). 
 69. See Welch Suggs, Federal Commission Discusses Possible Changes in Title IX 
Enforcement, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 29, 2002, at http://chronicle.com/ 
prm/daily/2002/08/2002082801n.htm. 
 70. The Department of Education reaffirmed this most recently in a letter from 
the Assistant Secretary of Education explaining the Department’s decision not to 
revise Title IX in light of the recommendations from the Secretary’s Commission on 
Opportunities in Athletics.  See Letter from Gerald Reynolds, supra note 4 
(“[N]othing in Title IX requires the cutting or reduction of teams in order to 
demonstrate compliance with Title IX . . . .”). 
 71. The Minority Report filed in response to the report of the Secretary’s 
Commission on Opportunity in Athletics recognizes as much, stating: 
Numerous civil rights laws apply the principle of “equalizing up” in 
authorizing remedies for discrimination—that is, raising opportunities for 
the disadvantaged group, rather than diminishing them for the previously 
benefited group, as a means of achieving civil rights compliance.  In 
providing technical assistance, the Department should advise schools of this 
principle, as well as providing information on techniques other schools have 
used to achieve this goal. 
MINORITY REPORT, supra note 3, at 11. 
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to men are not worth the added resources, or the restructuring of 
existing ones, that would be necessary to provide them to women.  
This determination, when made in response to claims for gender 
equality or concerns about Title IX compliance, goes to the heart of 
Title IX.72  A richer and more substantive understanding of equality 
would set limits on when lowering the treatment of the most-favored 
class, instead of improving the treatment of those hurt by inequality, 
suffices to cure the inequality at issue.  Title IX, and discrimination 
law more generally, should take a critical stance toward leveling down 
remedies to ensure that they do not exacerbate the expressive harms 
and social status injuries from the very discrimination challenged.73  
The law’s too-ready acceptance of such “leveling down” responses to 
discrimination perpetuates a formalistic conception of equality that 
risks undercutting the very values that discrimination law should 
protect. 
IV. FEEDING THE SPORTS MACHINE: THE ROLE OF MONEY IN 
JUSTIFYING SEX DISCRIMINATION IN SPORTS 
Despite Title IX’s success in opening up new opportunities for 
female athletes, the extreme privileging of the most-valued men’s 
sports has been entirely resistant to demands for gender equality.  
Title IX has failed to make inroads in restructuring sport to provide 
opportunities on an equal and sustainable basis for men and women, 
and that failure jeopardizes the prospects for further progress.  
Institutional strategies of cutting back men’s “minor” sports rather 
than adding new sports for women are fueled by a determination to 
preserve the privileged status of the most sacred men’s sports, which 
continue to receive ever-increasing influxes of cash.74  The resulting 
cash-crunch for women’s sports and the remaining men’s sports are 
dismissed as necessary capitulations to the market and the money-
                                                          
 72. The Department itself came close to acknowledging this tension with Title IX, 
stating: “Because the elimination of teams diminishes opportunities for students who 
are interested in participating in athletics instead of enhancing opportunities for 
students who have suffered from discrimination, it is contrary to the spirit of Title IX 
for the government to require or encourage an institution to eliminate athletic 
teams.”  Letter from Gerald Reynolds, supra note 4.  Yet, the Department has not 
gone so far as to impose Title IX-based legal limits on the practice of leveling down 
men’s opportunities in order to achieve gender balance in athletic programs, stating 
merely “that the elimination of teams is a disfavored practice.”  Id. 
 73. I develop this theory, and an argument for setting greater limits on leveling 
down remedies under equality law, more fully elsewhere.  See Brake, supra note 64. 
 74. See Suggs, supra note 9, at A31 (reporting that the average athletics budget 
for institutions in the six elite bowl championship series leagues increased from 
fourteen million to thirty-four million from 1996-97 to 2001-02). 
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making potential of football and men’s basketball.75  Insofar as Title 
IX threatens this status quo by pressuring institutions to find the 
resources necessary to add women’s sports, proponents of the status 
quo respond that they cannot afford to shift expenditures away from 
men’s “revenue sports.”  This claim amounts to an assertion that the 
costs of gender equality justify abandoning, or at least cutting back on, 
Title IX’s project of securing equality for girls and women in sports.  
This is the central issue today in debates about Title IX’s application 
to sports, and it is an issue that deserves further consideration. 
The standard response from Title IX supporters has been to contest 
the revenue-generation argument on its facts, questioning whether 
the economies of athletic programs really justify excess expenditures 
on men’s most-privileged sports.  Title IX advocates contend that the 
profitability of these programs is vastly overstated,76 and that net 
profits, such as they are, would not suffer from cutbacks on 
extravagantly excess expenditures.77  These arguments have a good 
deal of merit.  The profit margins of the big-time sports programs are 
notoriously inflated by creative accounting procedures,78 and even 
though some of these programs do bring in significant amounts of 
revenue,79 the profits do not necessarily require the profligate 
expenditures lavished on these programs.80  Many of these 
expenditures could be reduced without jeopardizing the potential for 
                                                          
 75. See id. at A30 (citing most recent data showing that “rising costs threaten 
both the progress of women’s sports and the future of men’s sports that don’t make 
any money”); see also Dobie, supra note 65, at C13 (“Generally, colleges are loath to 
make any cutbacks in football because of the long-held belief that football revenues 
fund the rest of the athletic program, including all those non-revenue producing 
women’s and men’s minor sports.”). 
 76. Dobie, supra note 65, at C14, C16 (stating that in the NCAA, “58% of Division 
I-A and I-AA football programs lose money, with average annual deficits of $1 million 
in I-A and $630,000 in I-AA” and noting that while some Title IX advocates want to 
reduce the number of football scholarships from eighty-five to seventy, college 
football coaches argue, as they did when football was forced to cut back from more 
than 100 scholarships, that such cutbacks would ruin the game). 
 77. See id. at C14, C16 (stating that Nebraska sacrificed expenditures on 
swimming and gymnastics, while putting in heating coils under the grass in the 
football stadium, and other institutions are known for housing players in hotels 
during nights before home games). 
 78. See Suggs, supra note 9, at A31 (noting that some athletics departments 
“count scholarships as revenue if the college itself allocates money to cover the 
expense”). 
 79. See id. (finding that Division I-A members outside the BCS reported spending 
deficits on sports while those inside the BCS reported an average profit of three 
million dollars, while Divisions I-AA and I-AAA reported losing, on average, over half 
a million dollars). 
 80. See Mark Pitsch, Todd Says He’s Shifting Course of UK Athletics, COURIER-J.  
(Louisville, Ky), Jan. 26, 2003, at C1 (stating that at the University of Kentucky, 
athletic department employees were provided with cars for their jobs and the athletic 
director earned more than the President of the University). 
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these programs to produce revenue, especially if universities worked 
together to collectively reduce costs so as to avoid risking competitive 
or recruiting disadvantages relative to other schools.81 
But wholly apart from its factual shortcomings, the revenue-defense 
taps into deep-seated cultural understandings about sport and gender 
that should be engaged in their own right.  In the debate over Title 
IX, claims about lost male athletes converge with cost-based 
justifications for maintaining a status quo structure that leaves little 
room for further expansion of women’s sports.  The claim boils down 
to the contention that, because men’s sports are more profitable, Title 
IX should not be interpreted in a way that hinders the marketability 
and profit-making potential of these sports.  To the extent that the 
market-based defense is accepted in this context, it raises questions 
about what kinds of markets justify discrimination and what costs 
institutions should have to bear in remedying discrimination.  A more 
general look at the role of cost in justifying discrimination will help 
illuminate the relevance of cost-based arguments under Title IX. 
A. Essentializing Inequality in the Body: The Convergence of the 
Market Defense and Covert Assessments of a Natural Gender Order 
Judicial rhetoric broadly repudiates cost-based considerations as a 
legitimate defense to sex discrimination.82  Early questions about the 
role of cost in discrimination law arose most prominently in a series of 
cases brought under Title VII in which employers admitted 
discrimination, but defended it as a necessary accommodation of 
discriminatory customer preferences.  The customer-preference 
defense is essentially a cost-based justification, premised on the 
employer’s fear of losing market-share if it disappoints customer 
expectations.  In a critical test of the law’s transformative potential, 
courts resoundingly rejected the customer-preference defense in 
challenges to airline practices hiring female-only flight attendants.83  
                                                          
 81. See id. (stating that only forty-eight of the 997 NCAA programs generate a 
profit, and quoting a men’s gymnastics coach whose program was cut as saying that 
there is an “athletic arms race” where each school tries to be the best nationally). 
 82. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 210 (1991) (“The 
extra cost of employing members of one sex . . . does not provide an affirmative Title 
VII defense for a discriminatory refusal to hire members of that gender.”); City of Los 
Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-18 (1978) (rejecting cost as a defense to 
discrimination under Title VII); Guardian Capital Corp. v. New York State Div. of 
Human Rights, 360 N.Y.S.2d 937, 938-39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), appeal dismissed, 396 
N.Y.S.2d 1027 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that a restaurant could not replace male waiters 
with scantily clad female waitresses, even if doing so increased its profit margins). 
 83. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(rejecting oil company’s defense to a Title VII sex discrimination claim that Latin 
American clients would refuse to deal with female executives); see also Diaz v. Pan 
Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that customer 
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These cases produced broad pronouncements that the cost of 
compliance is not a defense to a discrimination claim,84 and noted 
the circularity of relying on customer preference to justify 
discrimination when the very discrimination challenged had 
contributed to the construction of customers’ discriminatory 
preferences.85 
Yet, judicial rhetoric notwithstanding, discrimination law allows for 
greater deference to cost-based considerations than such 
pronouncements suggest.  The determination of whether to place the 
costs of nondiscrimination on employers depends not so much on the 
extent of the costs themselves, but on situational factors affecting the 
type of discrimination at issue and covert judicial attitudes about the 
legitimacy of a market preference for discrimination.  The 
determination of whether to impose the costs of nondiscrimination 
on employers turns largely on the extent to which courts believe that 
the discrimination at issue corresponds to differences in male and 
female bodies.  When courts believe that the gendered body is the 
source of the inequality at issue, they do not place the full burdens of 
nondiscrimination on employers, implicitly viewing the discrimination 
as “natural” and legitimate as opposed to socially constructed and 
suspect. 
For example, courts tend to defer to employer accommodation of 
privacy-based preferences for employees of one sex in jobs that 
involve intimate bodily touching or exposure.  Although the Supreme 
Court has never ruled on the legitimacy of privacy-based justifications 
for sex discrimination under Title VII, lower courts typically permit 
employers to discriminate on the basis of sex in jobs which involve the 
touching or viewing of intimate body parts.86  For example, courts are 
more likely to accommodate discriminatory preferences for 
employees of the same sex in jobs such as caretakers for nursing home 
patients or restroom attendants than in jobs that do not involve such 
                                                          
preference does not validate sex discrimination because the flight attendants’ services 
are not the primary function of the airline services as a whole); Wilson v. Southwest 
Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 295, 302 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (rejecting airline’s claim 
that its sex based hiring policy was necessary to run a successful business). 
 84. See Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 302 (“If an employer could justify employment 
discrimination merely on the grounds that it is necessary to make a profit, Title VII 
would be nullified in short order.”). 
 85. See id. at 303 (“Southwest exploited, indeed nurtured, the very customer 
preference for females it now cites to justify discrimination against males . . . .”). 
 86. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 n.4 (1991) 
(acknowledging that it has never addressed privacy-based justifications in sex 
discrimination claims, and noting that nothing in its present opinion calls into 
question lower court decisions accepting sex-based privacy concerns as a bona fide 
occupational qualification for jobs that implicate privacy interests). 
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bodily exposure or intimacy.87  In the former set of cases, courts make 
the implicit judgment that discriminatory preferences for workers of 
one sex are appropriate and worthy of deference.88 
In articulating what I believe to be implicit judgments about the 
naturalness of discriminatory market preferences, I do not mean to 
lend legitimacy to the idea that such preferences are natural and 
unconstructed.  Although courts may accept as natural a preference 
for workers of the same sex in jobs requiring intimate bodily 
exposure, such a preference is in fact socially constructed and 
culturally contingent.  It is predicated on a heterosexual presumption 
and a sexual norm favoring modesty, which together dictate that the 
body should not be exposed to persons of the other sex.  Intimate 
bodily contact and exposure among persons of the same sex, on the 
other hand, is presumed to be nonsexual and unlikely to induce 
attraction.  Even if the market preference for employees of one sex 
responds to feelings of shame and vulnerability, rather than the 
potential for attraction, it still rests on a heterosexual norm, reflecting 
the assumption that feelings of vulnerability or inadequacy in one’s 
body matter less when the body is exposed to persons of the same sex.  
By treating discriminatory preferences in such cases as natural and 
worthy of deference, courts relieve employers of the burden of 
defying cultural norms, as if expecting employers to bear the costs of 
transforming such preferences would be tantamount to expecting 
them to transform male and female bodies themselves. 
Judicial accommodation of discriminatory market preferences is 
not confined to cases raising privacy-based objections.  In other cases, 
where courts attribute sex discrimination to differences in male and 
female bodies, they are also more receptive to cost-based justifications.  
For example, the Supreme Court’s notorious first attempt to grapple 
with the bona fide occupational qualification defense in a sex 
discrimination case, Dothard v. Rawlinson, upheld Alabama’s 
                                                          
 87. See, e.g., id. at 219 n.8 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (citing lower court cases accepting privacy-based customer preferences as 
a bona fide occupational qualification in job settings such as a nurse’s aid and a 
washroom attendant); Local 567 Am. Fed’n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. 
Mich. Council 25, 635 F. Supp. 1010, 1012 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (stating that “it is clear 
that in certain situations privacy rights of individuals will justify sex-based 
classifications. These cases seem to involve occupations in which an employee must 
work with or around individuals whose bodies are exposed in varying degrees,” and 
citing cases). 
 88. See, e.g., Local 567, 635 F. Supp. at 1013-14 (“Obviously most people would 
find it a greater intrusion of their dignity and privacy to have their naked bodies 
viewed (or any number of personal services performed) by a member of the opposite 
sex.”); Spragg v. Shore Care, 679 A.2d 685, 694 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) 
(justifying sex-based discrimination for employees working in an environment 
involving the bodily exposure of their clientele). 
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exclusion of women from a maximum-security men’s prison even 
though greater expenditures would have enabled the prison system to 
operate safely with women as guards.89  The Court accepted 
Alabama’s argument that the exclusion of women from all contact 
positions working with maximum security male inmates was justified 
by the risk of sexual assault to women guards, asserting that the 
female plaintiff’s “very womanhood” prevented her from adequately 
performing the job of securing prison safety.90  The Court thus viewed 
the discrimination as biologically, rather than socially determined.  
The Court relied on the unique conditions of the Alabama maximum 
security facility, which failed to seclude or classify inmates on the basis 
of dangerousness and type of offense, and operated under conditions 
of severe overcrowding in violation of the Eighth Amendment.91  
Uncontradicted evidence showed that other state prison systems that 
followed general safety standards were able to effectively use women 
as guards in maximum security facilities.92  However, by locating the 
inequality in the female body and the rape-ability of women, the 
Court was able to obscure the institutional and cultural forces that 
placed women – and men – at risk of danger, and thereby naturalize 
the job discrimination in question.93  Although the state could have 
taken professionally accepted (and constitutionally required) 
measures to lower the level of dangerousness in its facility, the Court 
did not require the state to bear the cost of such measures.94 
The Dothard decision has been justly and resoundingly criticized 
for ignoring the obvious fact that men are also susceptible to rape in 
prison and that other prison systems have managed to successfully use 
women as guards in maximum-security male prisons.95  I share these 
criticisms, and view the Court’s central error as locating the inequality 
in women’s bodies, which enabled it to ignore the extent to which the 
danger to women (and men) was socially and institutionally created.  
Having focused on the body as central to the job, and the difference 
in male and female bodies as central to the inequality, the Court was 
                                                          
 89. 433 U.S. 321, 336-37 (1977). 
 90. Id. at 335. 
 91. Id. at 334-35. 
 92. See id. at 336 n.23 (recognizing that the conditions in Alabama’s 
penitentiaries are not common and cannot be compared to those prisons safe 
enough for female guards). 
 93. See id. at 336 (finding that the gender of the prison guard has a direct impact 
on the safety of a penitentiary with existing poor conditions). 
 94. Id. at 334-35. 
 95. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 1043, 1048-51 (1987) (discussing feminist criticisms of Dothard). 
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primed to accept the employer’s decision to exclude women as 
natural, and did not require the defendant to bear the costs of 
integrating women into its workforce. 
Another example of a case where judicial acceptance of sex 
discrimination is driven by perceptions of the female body is 
Chambers v. Omaha Girls’ Club, Inc.96  In Chambers, the employer 
was an organization dedicated to providing role models for young, 
adolescent women.97  When an unmarried female employee became 
pregnant, the employer determined that she could no longer serve as 
an adequate role model for young women.  Although the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act defines discrimination on the basis of sex to 
include pregnancy, the court accepted the employer’s defense, 
finding that the unmarried pregnant employee could not perform 
her job because her pregnancy undermined her ability to serve as a 
role model.98  As in Dothard, the source of the inequality was 
grounded in the female body, this time, the pregnant female body.  
The discrimination was viewed as corresponding to the natural 
meaning of the pregnant body, a meaning indicative of licentiousness 
and promiscuity, and incompatible with positive values.  The court 
treated the meaning of the pregnant body and its capacity to mentor 
young women as fixed, without questioning the cultural and 
institutional practices that assigned it that meaning.  Having 
grounded job performance in the body, the court was not inclined to 
require the defendant to undertake efforts toward cultural 
transformation that might challenge the social meaning of pregnancy 
and enable an unmarried pregnant woman to serve as a positive role 
model. 
Sometimes covert assessments of the naturalness of discrimination 
occur at the level of denying that discrimination exists, rather than 
evaluating customer- or client-based defenses to the discrimination.  
For example, judicial acceptance of employer sex-based dress codes 
and appearance standards stands out as an exception to the general 
rule that sex-based different treatment is invalid unless justified by a 
bona fide occupational qualification.99  Title VII challenges to sex-
based dress codes and standards of appearance rarely succeed, as long 
as the dress and grooming standards conform to community norms 
                                                          
 96. 834 F.2d 697, 703-04 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 97. See id. at 699 (maintaining that the purpose of the role model approach was 
for the girls to emulate the role models’ behavior and actions). 
 98. Id. at 702-03. 
 99. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1976) (upholding hair-
grooming standards as applicable to male members of the police force). 
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and professional expectations, however gendered.100  Generally, 
discrimination against individuals on the basis of sex is cognizable as 
discrimination, even if symmetrical constraints may be placed on 
persons of the other sex.101  However, in the dress code cases, courts 
typically refuse to see the “discrimination” at all, as long as both men 
and women are prohibited from “crossing over” to the gender 
presentation deemed suitable for the other sex.  These cases reflect an 
implicit judgment that employers should not be forced to bear the 
costs of challenging certain cultural expectations about gender. 
The dress code cases, much like Dothard, Chambers, and the 
privacy cases, reflect an underlying, unarticulated judgment that the 
body is central to the employment practice in question, and that the 
different treatment corresponds to differences in male and female 
bodies.  Together, when read in context with the courts’ general 
rejection of customer preference as a defense to discrimination, these 
cases reflect an implicit determination about when employers should 
have to bear the costs of nondiscrimination and when they should 
not.  The dividing line turns on implicit judgments about the 
“naturalness” of the gendered order confronted by discrimination 
law.  The willingness of courts to place such costs on airlines that 
capitulate to cultural preferences for sexy and nurturing female flight 
attendants is juxtaposed with a reluctance to place such costs on 
employers who conform to gendered expectations for appearance.  
The difference in the two contexts reflects an implicit judgment that 
the preference in the former type of case is constructed, undeserving 
of accommodation, while the preference in the latter situation is 
natural and grounded in the body. 
It is not that the body does not exist in cases like the airline 
litigation rejecting the market-based justification, but that courts see 
the interjection of sex difference stemming from the body as extrinsic 
to the flight attendant’s job.102  Having inserted the sexualized female 
body in a setting where it does not belong, the employer must bear 
the costs of cultural transformation in defying the customer 
                                                          
 100. See, e.g., Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380 (7th Cir. 1987); 
Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1985); Willingham v. 
Macon Pub’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 101. See, e.g., Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708 (judging discrimination at the level of the 
individual, without regard to absence of disparate burden on women as a group); 
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451 (1982) (rejecting employer’s argument that 
the bottomline treatment of African Americans as a group effectively countered any 
discriminatory impact of the employer’s test on African American individuals). 
 102. See Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 302 (explaining that “being female is not a 
qualification required to perform successfully the jobs of flight attendant and ticket 
agent”). 
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preference for a female-gendered body.  The customer preference in 
that case strikes courts as prejudicial, not natural.  In part, this reflects 
a covert determination to keep the gendered or sexualized body out 
of work settings where it does not belong.103  In workplaces that are 
already highly sexualized, in which sex is the commodity sold, the 
body’s presence is undeniable and customer preferences for the 
sexualized female body is a legitimate discrimination against male 
employees.104 
While courts do not explain their decisions in terms of the 
perceived naturalness of the existing gender order (although Dothard 
comes close), judicial determinations about when to saddle 
defendants with the costs of nondiscrimination often correspond to 
conventional and deeply held notions of “real differences” grounded 
in male and female bodies.  Broad judicial statements dismissing cost-
based justifications must be read in light of those cases in which courts 
shy away from placing the costs of nondiscrimination on defendant 
institutions.  Courts typically accede to market preferences for 
discrimination in cases where the body is perceived as central to the 
job and the source of the inequality.105  In such settings, the 
acquiescence in discriminatory market preferences reflects the 
judgment that, although discrimination law generally requires 
defendants to bear the costs of nondiscrimination, it does not require 
them to defy fundamental differences in male and female bodies and 
how people respond to them. 
B. The Role of the Market in Justifying Sex Discrimination in Sports 
Returning to the use of market justifications for the status quo in 
sports, I believe that a similar kind of covert assessment about the 
naturalness of sex inequality in sports is at work in this setting.  In the 
late nineteenth and even early- to mid-twentieth centuries, 
justifications for the exclusion of women from sports were expressly 
                                                          
 103. See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining 
Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 196 (2004) (discussing and 
defending the distinction in Title VII case law between employers who operate a 
highly sexualized workplace where sex is the commodity sold and are permitted to 
use sex as a bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”), from employers seeking 
to insert sex appeal into the non-sexual product or service sold, who typically are 
prohibited from using sex as a BFOQ). 
 104. See, e.g., Guardian Capital Corp. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 360 
N.Y.S.2d 937, 939-40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (Reynolds, J., concurring), appeal 
dismissed, 369 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (N.Y. 1975) (citing and discussing a case upholding sex 
as a BFOQ in the highly sexualized job of a Playboy Bunny). 
 105. But see Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 301 (stating that sex-linked aspects of a job 
must predominate over sex-neutral aspects in order for an employer to discriminate 
based on gender as a BFOQ). 
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grounded in the female body and fears that participation in sports 
would interfere with female reproductive functions.106  Today, 
explicit reference to the distinctiveness of female bodies as a rationale 
for inequalities in providing sport opportunities to women is no 
longer generally accepted.  As more and more girls and women have 
participated in sports, it has become implausible to perceive women’s 
bodies as incompatible with sports.  However, implicit judgments 
about differences in male and female athletic bodies continue to 
shape arguments and justifications for continued inequality in sports 
opportunities. 
Title IX takes an ambivalent stance with respect to the role of cost 
in a discrimination analysis.  On the one hand, cost has not succeeded 
as a defense to discrimination claims under the three-part test for 
measuring participation opportunities.107  However, in applying that 
test, courts have permitted institutions to cut minor men’s sports as a 
means of compliance, rather than requiring the reshaping of athletic 
programs to retain existing programs at a sustainable level of funding 
while adding new opportunities for women.108  The typical 
justification proferred by an institution for refusing to expand 
opportunities for women as the chosen method for Title IX 
compliance is cost—that the institution can not afford to reallocate 
resources away from its richest men’s teams. 
Title IX law intersects with cost-based justifications of inequality at 
another level as well.  Although courts interpreting Title IX have 
steadfastly proclaimed that cost is not a defense to discrimination, in 
some respects, the very selection of the three-part test as the measure 
of discrimination represents a capitulation to cost-based concerns.  
When the three-part test was established in 1979 as the measure for 
equal opportunity to participate in sports, it was chosen over other 
possible measures of equality.109  One alternative conception of 
                                                          
 106. See CHRISTINE LUNARDINI, WHAT EVERY AMERICAN SHOULD KNOW ABOUT 
WOMEN’S HISTORY: 200 EVENTS THAT SHAPED OUR DESTINY 328 (1997) (describing late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century prohibitions on female athleticism, based on 
beliefs that women were inherently fragile and that physical activity was detrimental to 
their health). 
 107. See, e.g., Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1518 (D. Colo. 
1993) (determining that defendants violated Title IX by eliminating the women’s 
softball team to reduce the athletic department’s costs), aff’d, 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 
1993); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 580, 583 (W.D. Pa. 1993) 
(concluding that the University could not cut women’s athletic teams even during a 
budget crisis); Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737, 750-58 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(holding that the University could not reject the women’s ice hockey team’s 
application for varsity status on the basis of financial concerns); Haffer v. Temple 
Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
 108. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898-99 n.15 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 109. See, e.g., Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy 
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equality might have allocated equal amounts of money to men’s and 
women’s sports programs and permitted male and female students to 
use the money to purchase the kinds of sports that best fit their 
interests.  In many respects, such a simple measure of equality would 
make more sense than the current three-part test, which measures 
opportunity based on actual participation and assumes, under prong 
three, that interest and ability to play varsity sports comes from the 
existing student body, rather than through recruitment.  However, 
equal funding for men’s and women’s sports was not chosen as a 
measure of equality, on either a per capita or absolute basis, because 
of the expectation that certain men’s sports would cost more than 
women’s sports.110  Title IX’s failure to require equal resources to be 
spent on men’s and women’s sports is itself a capitulation to costs 
based on a customer preference rationale. 
Finally, market considerations may shape the ultimate resolution of 
the ongoing controversy over how Title IX should define 
discrimination in sports.  To a large extent, the attack on the three-
part test rests on the premise that universities should not be required 
to cut back expenses for their most profitable men’s sports in order to 
add sports for women, and that the only option left, cutting back on 
men’s minor sports, is also unpalatable.  Thus, market considerations 
may affect how discrimination itself is conceptualized in this area.  As 
with the dress code cases, beliefs about the naturalness of sex 
difference are likely to play a role here as well.  For example, in a 
recent essay, Professor Gary Roberts argues for balancing gender 
equality, economics, and the interests of elite student athletes aspiring 
to professional sports careers in framing an equitable solution to the 
Title IX controversy.111  He recommends a set of proposals that 
would, inter alia, set some constraints on expenditures by institutions 
while at the same time accommodating, to some extent, the financial 
realities of institutions seeking to maximize football and men’s 
basketball revenues.  His willingness to make some accommodation 
                                                          
Interpretation; Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,420 
(Dec. 11, 1979) (explaining the agency’s decision to reject a previously proposed 
average per capita expenditures test in response to opposition in the notice and 
comment period).  The agency apparently did not seriously consider proposing an 
average per capita expenditures test that used enrollment, as opposed to sports 
participation, as a benchmark for measuring expenditures.  Id. 
 110. See id. at 71421 (recognizing “characteristics common to most revenue 
producing sports that could result in legitimate non-discriminatory differences in per 
capita expenditures,” and noting, for example, that “some ‘revenue producing’ sports 
require expensive protective equipment and most require high expenditures for the 
management of events attended by large numbers of people”). 
 111. See Gary R. Roberts, Evaluating Gender Equity Within the Framework of 
Intercollegiate Athletics’ Conflicting Value Systems, 77 TULANE L. REV. 997 (2003). 
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for the business aspects of sports appears integrally related to his 
ambivalence about whether disparities in opportunities in this area 
really amount to “discrimination.”  He cites the unique context of 
sports, and its allowance for sex-separation, as casting doubt on the 
applicability of traditional concepts of “discrimination.”  His view 
about the limits of “discrimination” is shaped by an understanding of 
the naturalness of gender difference in sports, and he reads Title IX’s 
accommodation of sex difference through the separation of sports 
programs as affirming this understanding.112  By locating male and 
female bodies as the source of remaining inequality in sports, this 
account leaves the concept of discrimination itself suspect as applied 
to women in sports, leaving more room for cost-based considerations 
to play a role.113 
Although conventional notions of difference in male and female 
bodies are no longer used to justify the exclusion of women from 
sports entirely, they still form the subtext for the law’s receptivity to 
market preferences as a justification for the status quo.  The revenue 
rationale for retaining the status quo in sports draws on deeply 
ingrained beliefs about differences in men’s and women’s bodies.  It 
assumes that the preference for watching men’s sports is natural, 
rather than socially or institutionally constructed.  Such implicit 
judgments are apparent, for example, in discussions about whether 
women’s basketball will ever draw the kinds of crowds that now flock 
to the men’s games.  Those who answer in the negative often cite 
men’s greater speed and height, which facilitate dunking, thus 
grounding the difference in spectatorship in the differences in male 
and female bodies.  When Title IX’s critics raise the revenue 
argument, they remind women that their sports make less money and 
that while women may play sports, they don’t play them the way men 
                                                          
 112. See id. at 1016 n.4 (noting a “complication to the concept of equal 
opportunity” in sports in that “[i]t is only in the context of gender in athletics that 
modern society accepts the principle of ‘separate but equal,’” and concluding “that 
there is something very different about men and women when it comes to sports that 
requires that we not use simple slogans or notions of ‘equality’ in considering the 
gender-equity issue”). 
 113. Although Professor Roberts is correct that Title IX’s approach to 
discrimination in athletics does not fit easily within the law’s typical formal equality or 
liberal framework, he does not consider other theoretical approaches that better 
support Title IX’s definition of discrimination.  See Brake, supra note 4, at 47-50 
(using feminist theory to explain and defend the three-part test as a tool for 
challenging institutional structures and cultures that construct male and female 
sports interests); see also Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for You and One for Me: Is Title 
IX’s Sex-Based Proportionality Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions 
Defensible?, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 731 (2003) (defending Title IX’s three-part test under 
a “tool-giving” distributional model of equality and a model of equality that promotes 
widely shared perfectionist values). 
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do or generate the same return for them.  The appeal to money in 
this way taps into lingering beliefs about natural differences between 
male and female bodies and how those differences define their 
participation in sports.  In such discussions, the extent to which 
spectatorship has been shaped and constrained by societal 
expectations and institutional investments is obscured. 
In fact, nothing about sports as played in today’s educational 
institutions is “natural”—not even what counts as a “sport.”  The 
popularity and revenue-producing potential of a sport is certainly not 
natural; it is carefully promoted and nurtured by the machinery of 
college (and professional) athletics.  It is a product of countless social 
and institutional factors, including longstanding and continuing 
investments in facilities, personnel, programs, recruiting, marketing, 
and coaching, just to name a few.  These investments contribute to a 
certain image and status of a sport that greatly affect its marketability.  
The existence of average differences in male and female bodies in 
height and upper body strength does not “naturally” translate into 
inequality in markets and spectatorship.114  In a different sports 
culture, shaped by different institutional practices, for example, 
women’s basketball, with its emphasis on passing, teamwork, and 
communication might be more highly valued and watched than a 
dunking match between superstars.  To the extent that appeals to 
market justifications succeed in this context, they do so because they 
tap into deeply held and little-examined beliefs that locate sex 
inequality in sports in male and female bodies. 
It is not yet clear whether discrimination law will require institutions 
to participate in the cultural reconstruction of gender norms in 
sports, in the same way that it has required the airlines to do in 
refusing to accommodate discriminatory preferences for female flight 
attendants, or whether it will shirk from placing the full costs of 
nondiscrimination on these institutions. To the extent that cost-based 
considerations have succeeded in legitimating the status quo in sports, 
it is because they still resonate with cultural beliefs about the natural 
inequality of male and female bodies in sports.  Courts tend to 
equivocate in placing the costs of nondiscrimination on defendants in 
settings where the body is situated as a prominent site of struggle.  
Although courts no longer justify discrimination against women in 
terms of “nature herself” and the “functions of womanhood,”115 there 
                                                          
 114. See generally COLETTE DOWLING, THE FRAILTY MYTH (2000) (arguing that even 
average differences in athletic performance are attributed to culture and not 
biology). 
 115. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872). 
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is still a tendency to essentialize sex inequality in the body, obscuring 
its societal and institutional origins. 
CONCLUSION 
With seemingly endless attacks on Title IX’s three-part test in 
recent years, supporters of Title IX have been consumed by efforts to 
defend and celebrate the gains in women’s sports participation that 
Title IX has enabled.  There has been little attention by legal scholars 
to the ways in which Title IX’s legacy has fallen short of its feminist 
promise.  This article begins to fill this gap.  Further developments in 
Title IX law along the lines discussed here will require changes in the 
culture and society in which girls and women play sports.  Shifting 
cultural understandings of gender and sports already have played a 
key role in fending off the recent challenge to Title IX posed by the 
Secretary’s Commission on Athletics.116  But while mainstream 
culture now accepts girls and women as athletes, it does not yet accept 
them as equally valuable players and participants.  The social 
constructionist understanding of sex inequality in sports has not yet 
infiltrated to the level necessary to challenge the deepest structures of 
bias in sports. 
 
                                                          
 116. See Letter from Gerald Reynolds, supra note 4 (stating that “[a]fter eight 
months of discussion and an extensive and inclusive fact-finding process, the 
Commission found very broad support throughout the country for the goals and 
spirit of Title IX”). 
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